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Between Science and Fiction




1 Of particular interest to the relationship between pragmatism and the social science of
history  is  the  parallel  relationship  of  the  social  sciences  to  the  humanities.  History
departments do not have a singular vision of where their discipline lies upon the long
spectrum of methods and self-images from the “soft” narrative and story-telling to the
“hard”  scientific  study  of  history.  Even within  departments  there  are  debates  about
whether  history  should  count  as  a  social  science  distribution  requirement  or  a
humanities  distribution requirement.  Therefore,  we need to look at  some conceptual
options for how to think about historical inquiry. That is, presenting a genesis of the
conceptual  options  will  give  us  a  lay  of  the  land,  enabling  us  to  see  the particular
contributions of classical American pragmatism to the method of historical inquiry. 
2 Between Martin Heidegger signaling the end of metaphysics (Heidegger 1927) and Jean-
François  Lyotard  characterizing  our  postmodern  condition,  (Lyotard  1979)  the  social
sciences faced a crisis.  Historicists of a postmodern hue, including but not limited to
Lyotard, responded to the Marxist Hegelian conception of history as a continuous series
of well-defined social worlds and showed that universalized philosophies of history were
in fact contingent products of socialization and cultural circumstance. This critical theme
registered as a rejection of any foundational meta-narrative structure meant to maintain
continuity throughout history. The American neo-pragmstist Richard Rorty registered an
attack on any philosophy attempting to mirror nature or cut it “at the joints,” by positing
an  incognizable  substructure  –  from  “God”  to  “substance,”  “matter,”  “energy,”  and
“atoms” – to secure its continuity and observability (Rorty 1985: 3). 
3 With philosophy qua metaphysics toppled, with all of its meta-narratives undermined, on
what ground could the social scientist stand to investigate human relations, social worlds,
and institutions? Worse still, how could historians understand the transformation of the
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same over time? Those engaged in the scientific study of history could either retreat to
the safe  and anticeptic,  but  increasingly questioned,  model  of  positivism or face the
postmodern abyss, eschew the gold standards of objectivity and truth, and reduce history
to narrative and discourse alone.
4 With the crisis in view, we are able to see the first of the conceptual options for the study
of history, historical positivism, which took a certain conceptual model of the natural
sciences as its guide. The next, which reacted most radically to the latter, is historical
relativism.  If  the  former  is  too  zealous  in  its  quest  for  certainty,  too  reliant  on  a
correspondence theory of truth, and too quick to efface the subjectivity of the historian
in her quest for certainty, the latter gives up too much, reduces history to narrative and
lacks the denotative reference needed to use historical knowledge to advance reforms
and solve problems. In short, one poses as science and the other gives in to fiction. 
5 The question for the pragmatist is always the same, what middle has been excluded when
the  crisis  qua dilemma  is  posed?  Hypothesizing  the  prospect  for  a  conservative  and
pragmatic philosophy of history demands that we reject the dilemma as false. Our task
then is  to take the critical  moments of  one model seriously – we must read Richard
Rorty’s seductive critique of foundationalism and the correspondence theory of truth
charitably. But in order to conserve the value of the social science of history, we need to
retreat to classical, not neo, pragmatism, paying special attention to John Dewey’s theory
of inquiry and the place of historical judgment therein. In the same way that the negative
and critical valence of Rorty’s work has antecedents and correlatives on the European
Continent, Dewey’s reconstruction of history qua inquiry has as its ally on the continent
Hans Georg Gadamer. Both of these figures, Gadamer explicitly, and Dewey in a parallel
context,  responded  to  what  Edmund  Husserl  referred  to  a  “crisis  of  the  sciences”
(Husserl  1970 [1937]).  Because  the  natural  sciences,  influenced by positivism,  had so
encroached on the social sciences, they were in need of a reconstruction of their method
and self-image. Gadamer and Dewey provide us with such a reconstruction. 
6 As we will see, those thinkers who might fall under the umbrella of pragmatism diverge
from one another on the nature of historical inquiry as much as some of them diverge
from those outside the umbrella. But the scholarly game of determining who is inside and
who is outside of club pragmatism is not the best way to spend our energy. Thus, one
premise  in  my  present  inquiry  is  that  pragmatism is  a  loose  constellation  of  those
thinkers sharing a certain attunements and methods of inquiry. As we will see, the mood
common among these figures includes those not ordinarily thought of as in the club. But
a pragmatic approach to inquiry is guided by the norm of openness; therefore, I ask my
audience to read pragmatically, to allow my denotative depiction of pragmatism to speak
for  itself,  and not  to  be  distracted if  my umbrella  is  cast  wide  enough to  include a
tradition from the European Continent – phenomenology. 
7 Gadamer gives us a philosophy of history which is pragmatic in that it refuses to efface
the  subjectivity  of  the  historian  in  terms  of  her  purposes,  guiding  interests,  and
conceptual  schemes.  Yet  Gadamer’s  philosophy  of  history  is  conservative  because  it
refuses to let the subjectivity of the historian become the whole of history. It tills and
harvests the soil of history in the admission that the field of potential data cannot be
reduced to the engines of its conceptual combine. Thus, there is always a limit to the
narratives it tells and always denotative reference points which can restrict its excesses.
Much as the blades of the combine’s thrasher jam when they encounter a stubborn rock
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in the soil, the historian’s ability to spin a tale may be resisted by the text she interprets,
according to Gadamer.
8 An understanding of history, reconstructed from John Dewey’s Logic: A Theory of Inquiry, is
one which views discourse as a function of inquiry, not the other way around (Dewey
1938). Dewey views inquiry as the response to the precarious and problematic character
of our biological and cultural environments. Language is an inherited set of tools to help
us navigate our inquiries. History qua inquiry views the study of history as a response to a
problematic  situation and an effort  to  resolve  it.  For  Dewey,  historical  inquiries  are
contextually situated in their theoretical frameworks and limited by their perspectives,
but historical propositions do not collapse into mere discourse. Dewey’s philosophy of
history  as  inquiry  avoids the  Rortyan  reduction  and  the  postmodern  abyss,  while
conserving the ability of inquiry in the social sciences to resolve problems. 
9 Those following the approach of both Gadamer and Dewey accept an anti-foundational
approach  to  social  scientific  inquiry,  while  constraining  it  with  an  improved
understanding of the relationship between the problems which give rise to our inquiries
and  the  tools  which  help  resolve  them.  Additionally,  their  approaches  to  historical
inquiry share a concern for the practical  application of  the study of  history.  Both see
historical  understanding registering as  a  norm of  application.  Further,  both see that
norm guiding the practice of judicial determinations in the court of law, and here we can
further see their shared pragmatic sensibility. If we are to conserve the ability of inquiry
in the social sciences to resolve problems, we might see how both Dewey and Gadamer
give space for historical inquiry to help a judge resolve problems demanding historical
understanding. In doing so, Dewey and Gadamer provide a theory of historical inquiry
consonant with a conservative and pragmatic judicial theory. 
10 If my umbrella of conservative and pragmatic approaches to historical inquiry seems as if
it is cast too wide, including a phenomenologist and a naturalist under its shade, I ask my
readers  to  read  what  follows  as  hopeful  pragmatists,  searching  for  the  beneficial
similarities between Gadamer and Dewey. They play the same theme, perhaps in different
keys.  But  be sure,  whether or  not  to sponsor Gadamer as  a  club member is  not  my
concern. 
 
Foundations for Science 
11 Since the time of René Descartes, the aspiration of philosophy was to establish knowledge
claims with such certainty as to ground the new science of Galileo and Newton on a firm
foundation.  René Descartes  posited the  cogito,  a  self-same thinking substance,  whose
security in its reason provided a foundational perspective from which to observe the
natural world and articulate its workings scientifically. Immanuel Kant figured that the
only way we could make any sense of the world was if all of our judgments about it were
accompanied by an “I” which does all the thinking, this the transcendental and synthetic
unity of apperception, an ego which necessarily accompanied all of our thoughts. Thus,
the cogito or the transcendental ego could be seen as continuous foundations for the
possibility of securing scientific claims.
12 But the most mature extension of this pursuit and quest for scientific certainty came with
the  “Vienna  Circle”  logical  positivists.  Inspired  by  the  realists  Bertrand  Russell  and
G. E. Moore, these philosophers, including Rudolph Carnap, preoccupied with theoretical
Between Science and Fiction
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
3
physics  and  symbolic  logic,  concerned  themselves  primarily  with  analysis  and
clarification of meaning with the primary goal of unifying the sciences and providing an
account of their operation (West 1989). The enterprise of logical positivism assumed a
form of  sentential  atomism,  which correlated isolated sentences with their  empirical
confirmation by science or with their logical necessity. The truth value of the former,
synthetic propositions was judged by the court of empirical observation and the scientific
method; the truth value of the latter, analytic statements was judged by the court of
formal logic. Sentences regarding ethics, art, or religion, corresponded to what looked
like the fictional trash-heap of emotion. The logical positivists reduced experience, (shot
through  with  affectivity  and  messiness),  to  sense  data.  This  reduction  translated
sentences about physical objects into sentences about actual and possible sensations. The
positivists  attempt  to  unify  the sciences  resulted  in  a  diremption  of  the  linguistic,
analytic, and theoretical from the empirical, synthetic, and observable (West 1989). 
13 Despite the fact that the positivists’ description of the physical and natural sciences was
inaccurate, the social sciences, in an attempt to differentiate themselves from philosophy
and develop their own “scientific” self-image, transformed the logical positivists’ model
of science into a reality by their practice of investigating social, cultural, and historical
phenomena under the model of positivism (Packer 2011). Making positivism a reality by
using its model in historical inquiry participated in what Husserl called the crisis of the
sciences.  By  treating  the  social  spheres  they  investigated  as  mathematizable  and
quantifiable,  the  social  scientist,  qua positivist,  lost  contact  with  “original  human
consciousness,” and elevated one “attitude toward objects” as “primary and others are
ignored and put into abeyance” (Kegley 1978: 187).
14 We might imagine what “historical positivism” would look like. The historical positivist
would state that there is a definite historical fact of the matter that resists revision. The
access we have to this fact is more or less an inductive method. The historian culls the
documents, which have survived into the present and investigates them with an aim to
abstract the general trends which emerge. The fact of the matter becomes what it is by
virtue of the number of survivals which speak to it. Borrowing from the positive sciences,
the historical positivist avoids lazy induction and seeks out potential documents which
might serve as methodological controls on a given question. The positivist tends to use
the language of sociology, of necessary and sufficient contributing factors, avoiding the
monolithic application of causality in historical relationships except where their claims
are most excessive. But the positivist does place a gold standard on quantifiable data and
place  less  emphasis  on  cryptic  survivals  which  demand  fallible  interpretation.  The
elevation of quantifiability to a gold standard runs parallel to the attempt to ignore the
fact that such a standard is itself an inherited, contingent historical artifact,  and can
impose itself on historical data, not allowing other data to speak. History of this sort
resists revision insofar as new, emergent attitudes, (the culturally informed subjectivity
of the historian) are irrelevant to the way the data speak to the facts. History of this sort
can be advanced, but only by the emergence of new data, amenable to judgment by the
gold standard, which problematize previous conclusions. Historical positivism advances
as science does, with better techniques of uncovering data and with more data to speak
for  itself.  Its  normative  touchstone  is  the  assurance  of  its  objectivity.  Its  enemy  is
subjective excess and reinterpretation devoid of new data. But as we will see its quest for
certainty  effaces  the  historian’s  subjectivity,  including  the  culturally  emergent
conceptual schemes she uses, from the process of historical inquiry.
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15 But the quest for certainty and objectivity in the social science of history need not abide
by all of the tenets of the aforementioned hypothetical model. The attempt to secure
natural science upon a firm foundation, as with Kant and the logical positivists,  runs
parallel  to actual  attempts to conduct  historical  inquiry upon foundational premises.
Consider the project of Wilhelm Dilthey, who sought out “a philosophical grounding for
historical knowledge” (Gadamer 2004: 215). If Kant had tried to discover how nature could
be  understood  through  mathematical  constructs,  Dilthey,  in  an  attempt  to  treat
experience  as  an  historical  science,  drew  a  parallel  between  the  coherence  and
significance found in the subjective experience of an individual and the coherence of
meaning found in the object of historical inquiry. Despite the fact that Dilthey himself
knew that the subject of historical inquiry was herself conditioned and contingent, he
still  sought  to  establish  “knowledge  of  what  was  historically  conditioned  as an
achievement of objective science” (Gadamer 2004: 225). Dilthey’s attempt to harmonize
the  human  sciences’  mode  of  knowledge  with  the  natural  sciences’  result-oriented
criteria led him to demand the same type of objectivity and method as in the natural
sciences, but this was only possible if he “neglected the essential historicity of the human
sciences” (Gadamer 2004: 233; Serequeberhan, 1987: 50). What I will show below is that
the type of  objectivity Dilthey had hoped for  is  not  suitable  to the social  science of
history.
 
Reading Rorty: The Negative Valence of Pragmatism 
16 The undermining of the project of logical positivism is apiece with the undermining of
historical inquiry guided by its foundational premises. A student of Carnap’s,  W. V. O.
Quine,  undermined this project of logical positivism from within.  In “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism,” Quine showed that the web of verification about the meaning of observable
phenomena was not so thin as to correspond to the truth-value of single sentences (Quine
1951).  Instead  the  web  needed  to  be  cast  wider  to  include  entire  theories  and
communities  of  language  users.  Nor  could  each  synthetic  statement  improve  its
likelihood of truth by the occurrence of a specific set of sensory events. In these ways,
Quine showed that the verification theory of meaning and the reductionism on which it is
founded, atomized human experience to such a degree that it ignored the corporate and
communal character of knowledge, and the communal origins of its use (Quine 1951).
Further, Quine’s critique showed just how theory-laden all observation is because the
observer brings with her the language of her community and the conceptual schemes and
inherent prejudices built therein.
17 But the most revolutionary critique of this shortcoming in academic philosophy in the
twentieth century was Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature.  In it,  Rorty
employs,  among  other  tools,  Quine’s  holism  and  Dewey’s  naturalism  to  topple  the
presumption  that  Nature  speaks  the  language  of  science,  calling  for  an  end  of
philosophy’s task of mirroring nature in mental representation and language. Rorty, by
reference to Quine, showed that observation was so theory-laden that truth claims about
the world by appeal to a world were bound to be circular.  As Cornel West described
Quine’s position, “We cannot isolate ‘the world’ from theories of the world, then compare
these theories of the world with a theory-free world. We cannot compare theories with
anything  that  is  not  a  product  of  another  theory”  (West  1989:  197).  Rorty,  a
thoroughgoing anti-realist, thinks there is a world out there, but that it does not speak
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the language which we create in trying to navigate it. Rorty described his rejection of the
correspondence theory of truth, (the mirroring of reality in the mind or in language),
when he wrote:
The pragmatists conclude that the intuition that truth is correspondence should be
extirpated rather than explicated. On this view, the notion of reality as having a
“nature” to which it is our duty to correspond is simply one more variant of the
notion that the gods can be placated by chanting the right words. The notion that
some one among the languages mankind has used to deal with the universe is the
one  the  universe  prefers-the  one  which  cuts  things  at  the  joints-was  a  pretty
conceit. But by now it has become too shopworn to serve any purpose. (Rorty 1985:
3)
18 Rorty  views  language,  including  narrative  and social  scientific  vocabularies  –  not  as
representing and corresponding to an external reality – but as thoroughly instrumental.
These vocabularies are tools we use to solve problems and make the world as we hope it
will be, but they are historically emergent and thus contingent. In Irony, Contingency and
Solidarity, Rorty tells us how the “historicist turn,” (his phrase for the contributions of
Hegel, Marx, and Darwin), helped the intellectual community get beyond a confrontation
between those, like Plato, who thought that private psychology and public justice were
internally  related,  and those  like  Nietzsche,  who thought  that  conceptions  of  public
justice were only artifices of private wills to power (Rorty 1989). Rorty paints Nietzsche as
an  anti-Enlightenment  thinker,  but  one  who  exhibits  all  of  the  tendencies  of  the
Enlightenment, such as universalizing some particular human tendency, (for Nietzsche
the will  to power),  as  most  fundamental,  and therefore one who fails to get  beyond
metaphysics as he had hoped. According to Rorty, historicists showed that any of these
formerly universalized tendencies were contingent products of socialization and cultural
circumstance (Rorty 1989: viii). 
19 Rorty’s work, building on the conclusions he draws in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,
argues against the project of unifying public and private strivings in theory and for a
program sufficiently  ironist,  historicist,  and  nominalist  (Rorty  1989:  xv).  The  liberal
ironist  “faces  up  to  the  contingency  of  his  or  her  most  central  beliefs  –  someone
sufficiently  historicist  and nominalist  to  have abandoned the idea that  those central
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance” (Rorty
1989: xv). The Rortyan ironist understands that her own driving beliefs are historically
contingent  and  that  they  are  merely  nominal,  not  referring  or  participating  in  any
conceptual reality; however, the ironist strives to achieve those beliefs, whether private,
aesthetic self-creations, or calls to public solidarity and mutual recognition, in spite of
their nominalism and lack of metaphysical or theological foundation (Rorty: xv). 
20 The lynchpin holding together Rorty’s program is the contingency of language. Rorty
rejects the “old” idea that any of our chosen “vocabularies,” whether poetic or scientific,
can tap into or correspond to any metaphysical or noumenal in-itself. We cannot mirror
nature and should give up such a quest (Rorty 1989: 4). For Rorty, nature does not speak,
only we do, and all metaphysics, even that which invests history into it, as Hegel’s did, is
really only a description of various radical redescriptions (which Hegel had interpreted as
the  movement  of  Spirit  through  history)  (Rorty  1989:  7).  According  to  Rorty,  the
positivists view their language, and therefore their historical propositions, “as gradually
shaping  [themselves]  around  the  contours  of  the  physical  world,”  where  “Romantic
history of culture sees language as gradually bringing Spirit to self-consciousness” (Rorty
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1989: 19). Rorty thinks that philosophy of language, and therefore philosophy of history,
blindly evolve according to the needs to the linguistic community.
 
Historical Relativism 
21 But  Rorty’s  critique  of  foundationalism  and  correspondence  theory  of  truth,  in  its
undermining of attempts to ground the sciences and achieve objectivity in the human
sciences, ends up presenting only a polar opposite approach to the philosophy of history
–  relativism.  The  proponent  of  this  postmodern  view of  history  sees  the  inevitable
reduction of historical narratives to sheer interests in the present. For Rorty we can write
history as  adaptation to  present  circumstances  and needs  by spinning stories  whose
vocabulary does not shape itself around the contours of any objective reality, but which
adapts blindly to the needs of the historian. For Rorty, history as narrative discourse is
just redescriptive novelty at our service. 
22 Rorty’s philosophy of language is pragmatic, in that it builds on Dewey’s philosophy of
language  to  a  certain  extent,  viewing  language  as  instrumental  and  evolutionary.
However, the question which must be posed is, how does it stand with respect to the
relationship between the purpose of historical inquiry and the tool of propositions which
function historically? Language is a tool,  and a language of scientific mechanism, not
metaphorical flight, suits our purposes better when we want to engineer a machine or do
biochemistry. However, historical propositions solve problems too. How do the problems
stand in relation to the tools  which help resolve them? If  all  linguistic  propositions,
situated within a given vocabulary, are redescriptions, then from what perspective do we
judge  which  redescriptions  better  resolve  the  problem  which  led  to  our  historical
inquiry? That perspective need not be metaphysically foundational;  it  would be more
impoverished  to  think  itself  so  –  which  is  why  we  need  to  read  Rorty’s  anti-
foundationalism charitably. But historical inquiry should be clear about the genesis of its
own scheme of appropriation and the method of its employment. The more these are
opaque  to  the  analysis,  the  worse  off  history  is,  not  ontologically,  but  functionally.
Historical knowledge is not simply a feature of reflection, and the process of selecting
data for historical inquiry cannot be completed in total each time it is exerted. Instead,
each  historian  provides  restraint  and  resistance  to  all  others,  as  do  the  texts  they
interpret. The field of potential data for historical investigation can be resistant to the
concepts used to select and interpret it, and the community of inquiry converges on a
more functionally correct history by their redescriptions. Their inquiries are contextually
situated  in  their  theoretical  frameworks  and  limited  by  their  perspectives,  but  they
cannot reduce their field of research to that framework without collapsing their own
historical propositions into mere discourse. Rorty sees inquiry as a linguistic expression
of discourse, but the classical pragmatists see this the other way around – discourse is
only a part of inquiry, not its entirety (Hickman 2007: 51).1
23 If  we examine the sheer interest driving the relativist’s use of history, we find those
interests  embedded  in  some  customary  practice,  governed  by  a  practical  norm
concerning the practical outcome of the interest and the articulation of that interest as
conceptually  understood.  Being  intellectually  honest  about  the  use  of  history  in  a
thorough, inclusive, coherent way does not only abide by the intellectual norm of formal
self-consistency, it abides by the pragmatic norm of bringing theory and practice closer
together.  Getting  history  more  correct  does  too.  The  postmodernist  philosopher  of
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history can only offer these discursive descriptions and revisions,  and these lack the
potential to provide platforms of restraint and denotative reference (Hickman 2007: 51).
Pragmatism provides these stable platforms while accepting anti-foundationalism. 
24 The answer to the relativist,  including Rorty,  is  that some norm will  drive historical
inquiry, and the consequence of separating the intellectual norm of inquiry from the
embedded  norms  of  praxis  is  unpragmatic,  leading  to  a  greater  separation  between
theory and practice. That is, the intellectual norms of dealing with history pragmatically,
including honesty, inclusion, thoroughness, skeptical reserve, and a melioristic faith, are
kinds  of  embedded  norms  of  praxis.  Thinking  is  an  activity,  and  doing  this  well  is
governed by norms which are continuous with ethical  norms guiding other types of
activities.  Thomas  Grey  provides  a  reminder  of  this  insight:  “Thought  always  comes
embodied  in  practices  _  culturally,  embedded  habits  and  patterns  of  expectation,
behavior and response” (Grey 1991: 9, 12). The norms governing our habits and patterns
of thought do not allow historical inquiry to be reduced to narrative, as Rorty would have
it.
25 I propose that we take the negative and critical valence of Rorty’s postmodern view of
history seriously without reducing historical inquiry to the subjectivity of the historian
or her contingent cultural schemes of appropriation, (and that includes the schemes of
the positivists). We can reject the need for a metaphysical foundational perspective and
view  language  as  thoroughly  instrumental  and  evolutionary,  while  not  reducing
historical inquiry to discursive flight. As we will see, classical pragmatism retains the
negative  and  critical  moments  of  postmodernism,  resisting  hasty  universalism,
foundationalism,  and  naive  correspondence  theories  of  truth.  But  the  classical
pragmatists  want  their  historical  inquiries  to  do more than just  redescribe.  Classical
pragmatists find that while some concepts, such as “the individual,” whose ontological
security  had  been  deconstructed  by  a  variety  of  postmodern  critiques,  are  useful
outcomes of situated historical inquiries and can be used as platforms in future inquiries,
as long as their use is sensitive to the context of the involved situation of the future
inquiry.
 
Dewey’s Theory of Historical Inquiry in the Key of
Naturalism
26 Dewey embedded his discussion of the nature of historical judgments within his broader
examination of the pattern of inquiry. Dewey was working against several mistakes in the
philosophy of logic, which treat logic as either merely dependent upon subjective and
mentalistic states and processes, as mere copies of antecedent empirical materials, or as
originating outside experience from an a priori or transcendental source (Dewey 1938).
Dewey identifies logic with methodology, the theory of inquiry,  of which the guiding
principles  and  criteria  emerge  empirically  but  have  rational  standing  as  affairs  of
relations of means to consequences. This logic is progressive: logical forms read off from
sciences  no  longer  respected  by  the  community  of  inquiry  do  not  provide  coherent
accounts of existing scientific methods, and as such, demand revision. The subject-matter
of logic is determined operationally. It inquires into both the materials of experimental
observation and the symbols which direct reflection on those materials. Furthermore, the
latter element in the operation of the logic is delineated by reference to the existential
conditions and consequences of the former. But logic is naturalistic: Dewey postulates
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that the biological and cultural existential matrices of inquiry are continuous with the
matrix in which inquiry is formal, rational, and takes its own symbols and language as its
subject matter. Dewey does not dichotomize realms of inquiries; instead they lie on a
spectrum from the  problematic  situations  of  the  live  creature,  to  common sense,  to
controlled scientific investigation, to inquiry directed at its own methodology. Although
logic is naturalistic, it is a social discipline, conditioned by the natural, communal, and
linguistic interactions in of those in community with each other. The logical forms are
postulates of inquiry made of and for inquiry as formulations of conditions to be tested by
further inquiries until they yield warranted assertibility, (Dewey’s fallible replacement
for truth). They are not the ultimate a priori grounds or transcendental conditions for
possible inquiry yielded by intuition or pure reason.  Yet logic is  autonomous.  It  is  a
circular  process  because,  as  inquiry  into  inquiry,  it  only  depends  on  that  which  is
connected  to  inquiry  and  thereby  rules  out  the  importation  of  metaphysical  or
epistemological presuppositions, (such as the self-same cogito) “shoved under inquiry as
its foundation” (LW 12: 28). 
27 Inquiry follows a pattern, and as we will see below, historical inquiry is no exception. The
antecedent condition of inquiry is an indeterminate situation, which is permeated and
defined by  its  particular  doubts,  questions,  uncertainties,  and discomforts.  Once this
precarious situation is subjected to inquiry, it is constituted as a problematic situation.
This is a step in inquiry as there has been movement from complete indeterminacy to the
identification of the constituents and terms of a given situation,  pointing to possible
solutions.  Reasoning ensues as to direct existential  operations by an idea in order to
terminate  in  a  resolution  by  rearranging  the  conditions  of  indeterminacy  toward
settlement and unification. 
28 Dewey frequently uses the example of a trial-at-law to depict both the nature of the
pattern of inquiry and to explain denotatively the nature of a judgment.  The trial  is
analogous to a problematic situation, which requires resolution. The disagreement and
conflict regarding the significance of what happened led to the uncertainty and dispute in
the case. Dewey writes, “The judicial settlement is a settlement of an issue because it
decides existential conditions in their bearing upon further activities: the essence of the
significance of any state of facts” (LW 12: 124). The judgment is the outcome of inquiry
patterned above.  The rules of  the judicial  system fix the significance,  relevance,  and
materiality of the facts produced as evidence. But the quality of the situation, civil or
criminal for instance, determines those rules to a certain extent. The rules of the system,
therefore, are analogous to the conceptual structures of inquiry brought to bear on a
problematic  situation.  The  past  bears  on  the  process  of  inquiry  by  providing  the
standards and rules applicable to various kinds of cases. Dewey summarizes by stating:
“The theoretical ideal sought to guide judicial deliberation is a network of relations and
procedures which express the closest possible correspondence between facts and legal
meanings  that  give  them their  significance”  (LW 12:  124).  The  consequences  of  the
decision are the effects of the disposition of the originally indeterminate case, and the
problematic situation is resolved by being directed as future activities. Dewey’s view of
historical inquiry is more conservative than Rorty’s,  in that it maintains a continuity
between the purpose of the need for inquiry and the resolution to the indeterminacy
which gave rise to the inquiry. Dewey answers the more relevant question of what type of
historical  analysis  can  contribute  to  the  resolution  of  a  more  specific,  novel,  and
indeterminate case. The pragmatic turn in philosophy generally evades the attempt to
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achieve  exact  correspondence  with  truths  antecedent  to  inquiry  –  the  dream  of
positivism’s quest for certainty – in favor of the project of describing and reflecting on
experience in order to generate concepts evaluated by their social consequences. Rorty’s
view of history is pragmatic in just this sense. 
29 But Dewey, although representative of this turn in philosophy, investigates the grounds
upon which some historical judgments are made more credible than others. But this was
not an attempt to recreate a map of past events on a one-to-one scale, as the positivist
would suggest as an aim. Rather, Dewey sought to understand the nature of historical
judgments with regard to “the relation of propositions about an extensive past durational
sequence to propositions about the present and future” (LW 12: 231). Thus, the relation
among these propositions concerns their credibility, relevance, criterion for selection,
and multivalent temporal structure. Historical analysis, like inquiries into contemporary
physical situations, demand a search for relevant data, criteria for selection formed as
conceptual  principles  for  determining  the  relevance  of  the  data,  and  systematic
conceptions working to arrange the selected data. When historical analysis observes and
sorts the data and confirms it as authentic data, the result is propositions about facts
which  exist  in  the  present,  serving  as  the  material  for  historical  inference  and
reconstruction. These propositions are relevant only in relation to the problem which
demanded their search and evaluation, and as such, they are responses to a problematic
situation. The historical analysis evaluates and selects these propositions, and not others,
based  on  the  conceptual  subject-matter  with  which  it  operates.  But  this  conceptual
subject-matter is too often opaque to the analysis and works as a tacit presupposition.
Perhaps in the quest to avoid mere subjectivity, the historian does not reflect upon the
problem which demanded the analysis or the conceptual subject-matter which aids the
evaluation  and  interpretation  of  the  relevant  propositions  –  this,  the  problem  of
objectivity in the social sciences Gadamer addresses. Thus, the pursuit of objectivity in
historical analysis renders it culturally subjective, and the historical sense is susceptible
to Rorty’s critique of positivism and foundationalism. 
30 Dewey reminds us that the conceptual material employed in writing history is that of the
period in which it is written. The more transparent this is made during the analysis the
more likely the historian is to abstract the conceptual schemes which a given culture
under historical  analysis brings to the selection of  relevant data left  available to the
present historian as artifacts. In this sense, history is of the present and of that which is
judged significant by the present cultural milieu. The more pressing concerns of the day,
whether economic or political, color and direct the investigations into the past, just as
the record of rainfall in an ancient civilization brings to light its importance to their
then-present situation. Furthermore, the naïve assumption that history is of the past, and
had by direct access to history books, is a logical impossibility since “the past is a past-of-
the-present,  and the present is the-past-of-a-future-living present” (LW 12:  237).  Past
events register as relevant because they evince changes, and those changes can only be
made evident from the perspective of a given purpose of an inquiry. History must always
be rewritten given these temporal and logical observations. Additionally, cries against
revisionist history (as disruptions of the settled facts) are as naïve as the view of history
as directly accessible via history books. The clarification of these subtleties, including the
observation that the current writing of history becomes relevant data for selection by
future historians, renders historical analysis more humble, fallible, and self-transparent.
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And these traits, as we will see, could serve the judge doing legal history in an effort to
resolve the problematic case at hand.
31 Dewey’s  philosophical  reflections  on  historical  methodology,  which  embed  historical
analysis into a discussion of logic and inquiry, split the difference between the naiveté of
positivism  and  the  excesses  of  postmodernism  and  Rortyan  relativism  at  the  other
extreme. His philosophy of history avoids nominalism and the pitfalls both historical
positivism and historical relativism. Concerning the latter, historical knowledge is not
simply a feature of reflection, which, with its dialectical and self-undermining structure
and  genesis,  can  undermine  praxis.  Nor  can  the  act  of  selecting  data  for  historical
investigation exhaust  the  data  investigated.  The field  of  potential  data  for  historical
investigation is  independent of  the concepts used to select  any given data.  While all
inquiry  is  contextually  situated  in  a  theoretical  framework,  conceptual  scheme,  and
perspective, reducing the field of data to the scheme chosen turns the results of inquiry
into mere discourse and dialectic. But as Larry Hickman points out, for Dewey, discourse
is a phase of inquiry, not the other way around. Dewey resists the “infinitely self-reflexive
nexus of literary descriptions” of postmodernist history as “divisive relativism” in favor
of “the denotative method,” which always returns his deliberations to the “pushes and
pulls of existential affairs” (Hickman 2007: 21). Dewey writes:
Intelligent understanding of past history is to some extent a lever for moving the
present into a certain kind of future. No historic present is mere redistribution, by
means of  permutations and combinations,  of  the elements of  the past.  Men are
engaged neither in mechanical transposition of the conditions they have inherited,
nor  yet  in  simply preparing for  something to  come after.  They have their  own
problems to solve; their own adaptations to make. They face the future, but for the
sake  of  the  present,  not  of  the  future.  In  using  what  has come  to  them  as  an
inheritance from the past they are compelled to modify it to meet their own needs,
and this process creates a new present in which the process will continue. History
cannot escape its own process. It will, therefore, always be rewritten. As the new
present  arises,  the  past  is  the  past  of  a  different  present.  Judgment  in  which
emphasis falls upon the historic or temporal phase of redetermination of unsettled
situations is thus a culminating evidence that judgment is not a bare enunciation of
what already exists but is itself an existential requalification. (LW 12: 238)
32 In summary, the writing of history is an inquiry responding to a problematic situation,
whose resolution is a judgment based upon the facts which present themselves to us in
the present. History is of the present and is inferential. In history qua inquiry, we see that
all history proceeds from a certain set of present interests, which directs the study. For
Dewey,  clarifying  these  interests  and  their  accompanying  biases  genetically  and
methodologically makes for good history. Genetically, we need to understand how our
social customs and individual habits give rise to the values which direct our inquiry.
Methodologically, we need to show how those values give us our conceptual schemes of
inquiry  and  render  some  facts  relevant  and  amenable  to  those  conceptual  schemes
(Dewey 1925; Auxier 1990). 
 
Gadamer’s Theory of Historical Inquiry in the Key of
Phenomenology
33 John  Dewey  is  not  the  only  representative  figure  of  this  philosophy  of  history.  His
philosophy of historical judgment is not merely a product of turning the inquiry crank
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according to the pattern he laid out and applying the crank to historical data. Rather,
other  philosophers  from  disparate  traditions  have  arrived  at  similar,  pragmatic
conclusions regarding the nature of historical inquiry. What we will see in Gadamer’s
view of history, building on the tradition of phenomenology, is an explication of the role
of  prejudice in making historical  judgment.  Gadamer eludes Rorty’s  relativism,  while
admitting the role of subjectivity in historical analysis, but in a mediated, constrained
way.
34 The  search  for  a  philosophy  of  historical  inquiry  which  rejects,  alongside  Rorty,  a
foundational  perspective  from  which  to  conduct  historical  inquiry  in  a  quest  for  a
certainty,  brings us to Gadamer,  who represents another conservative and pragmatic
view  of  historical  inquiry.  Gadamer’s  method  emerges  from  the  phenomenological
tradition initiated by Edmund Husserl, and continued in phenomenological ontology by
Martin Heidegger. The two great movements which grew out of Heidegger’s Being and
Time were deconstruction and hermeneutics. The former, motivated by Heidegger’s call
for the destruction of Western metaphysics, gave rise to many figures, such as Foucault
and Derrida, but also Rorty. Gadamer, as a branch of this latter tradition of hermeneutics,
represents a method constrained by conservative and pragmatic norms of inquiry, which
resist  the  infinite  interpretation  of  the  postmodern  philosophers  either  doing
deconstruction  in  literary  criticism  or,  alongside  Rorty,  merely  undermining  meta-
narratives meant to provide history with continuity.
35 Gadamer’s  inheritance  of  Husserl  and  Heidegger  is  complex.  Husserl  gave  his
philosophical  progeny several  persisting insights.  First,  Husserl  refocused the inquiry
away  from  the  what of  givenness  to  the  how of  givenness.  Too  many  hypothetical
constructions and naturalistic assumptions corrupted the purity of the former mode of
investigation,  according  to  Husserl.  Husserl’s  quest  to  rid  logic  of  its  psychologistic
tendencies eventually led him to his phenomenological reduction and epoché (Husserl
1913). Here, he could give a description of experience uninhibited by either the natural
attitude or any naturalistic concepts.2 The importance of this for our purposes is that
such rigorous attention to the mode of givenness demanded that explanatory devices
emerge from a radically empirical description of the modes of givenness, and this resisted
the  importation of  concepts  outside  of  or  antecedent  to  such contextual  and modal
descriptions.  Here  we  see  the  skeptical  warning  against  a  failure  to  abide  by  this
procedure.  For  Husserl  the  constant  danger,  of  allowing  our  aesthetic  and  moral
experience to be reduced to the modes of quantification and efficient causation evoked as
naturalistic gold standard, signaled a crisis of the sciences. As a positive contribution to
this constant threat, Husserl gave phenomenological description of both the constitution
of natural, psychic, and spiritual regions of experience (in Ideals II) (Husserl 1952) and the
constitution of  the laws of  logic  and reason in the phenomenological  transcendental
aesthetic (in Analysis  of  Active  and Passive  Synthesis)  (Husserl  2001 [1929]).  The former
asked that  concepts constituted in different modes of  experience be applied to their
appropriate region, preventing the crisis, while the latter gave an experiential origin to
the original sense-giving sources grounding and accomplishing scientific knowledge. This
latter description was in an effort to illuminate, animate, and integrate the sciences into
“the spiritual nexus of humanity” (Husserl 2001: 5). 
36 Pragmatism worked to advance the same effort. Dewey warned against the philosopher’s
fallacy, of taking the conceptual and abstract products of inquiry and treating them as
inhering in the indeterminate experience which gave rise to need for inquiry or as easily
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exportable  to  disparate  contexts  of  inquiry.  These  efforts  in  phenomenology  and
pragmatism are  normative  throughout  and  they  warn  against  the  tendencies  which
Husserl referred to as the crisis. 
37 Husserl characterized our experience of time as a synthesis of retentions and protentions.
In retention we carry with us our just-past without actively presenting it to ourselves as
in memory. In protention we tacitly anticipate our near-futures by expecting that our
experience  conforms  to  that  which  we  have  habituated  in  passive  synthesis.  Our
anticipations  of  concordance,  based  on  certain  retentions,  unfold  against  an
indeterminate horizon of possibility. But we appropriate them for our pre-understanding
of  future  experience.  Our  pre-understanding  is  the  experiential  substratum  for  the
understanding  which  predicates  our  active  characterizations  of  experience.  We  can
confirm  experience  as  concordant,  discordant,  fulfilled,  or  unfulfilled,  and  these
judgments are based on a more primordial pre-understanding of experience. Husserl’s
expression  for  the  pregivenness  of  objects  of  the  understanding  was  vorgegebenheit
(Husserl 2001). 
38 Heidegger’s extension of the phenomenological method and his demand to combine this
with ontology is well-known and documented, but I must give Heidegger some treatment
if we are to understand Gadamer’s hermeneutics more fully. In Heidegger’s early thought,
the vor-structure of the understanding comes to fruition, and Gadamer continues it with
respect  to  analysis  and  interpretation.  Heidegger  takes  Husserl’s  analysis  of  time
consciousness, drags it through history and experience, and the result is a description of
the essential structures of Dasein. For Heidegger, Dasein, or human situatedness – the
being for whom Being is a question – engages in the world of entities in a way constantly
affected by its past, and this pastness of Dasein registers as attunement to the world, or
mood. But Dasein, in order to recover itself from inauthentic modes of engagement, must
also investigate the experience of its ownmost possibilities, and possibility registers as an
orientation to the future. Thus, Dasein, as understanding, is projective of its Being upon
possibilities. To develop itself, Dasein must develop the understanding as interpretation.
Interpretation  is  the  “working-out  of  possibilities  projected  in  understanding”
(Heidegger 1962: 149). That which as been encountered as ready-to-hand is understood,
then comes to be interpreted. The condition of this possibility is that the object which is
to be understood as something must already be accessible to the understanding, so that
this  as-structure  may  be  made  to  stand  out  for  us.  This  access  presupposes  a  pre-
understanding at work. The interpretation we seek as Dasein, which is of ourselves, has
already been determined in a way of  envisagement by an advanced grasping,  a  fore-
conception of  the  understanding  (Heidegger  1962).  Heidegger’s  expression  for  this  is
related  to  the  verb  vorgreiffen (“to  anticipate”)  and  to  the  noun  Begriff,  (“concept”)
(Heidegger 1962: 150). Here we can see these terms as connoting a pre-conceptualizing or
an  anticipation  of  a  conceptualization at  work  in  the  interpretive  process  of  the
understanding. The operative term at work in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which expresses
phenomenological  inheritance  in  terms  of  the  vor-structure  of  the  understanding,  is
Vorteilung (“prejudice”) (Gadamer 2004: 241). 
39 Gadamer’s impetus to clarify a conception of interpretation was not far a field from the
articulations of the crisis above. He felt that the human sciences, (conceived as the “moral
sciences,” Geisteswissenschaften,  or the humanities) were borrowing the inductive logic
from the natural  sciences  as  their  sole  method.  But,  much in  line  with Husserl  and
Heidegger, this copying of the natural and positive sciences ends in an effacement of
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subjectivity as it attempts the impossible – investigating the object of inquiry from a
nowhere perspective. That is, the natural sciences invoked a methodology that cannot
incorporate the subject with its conceptual schemes and prejudices into its self-aware
task. 
40 Gadamer  assumes  a  self-consciously  phenomenological  approach  in  his  task  of
reinvesting  the  human  sciences  with  an  understanding  of  the  human  condition  as
interpretive through and through. This registers as a movement away from the whatness
of the study (with its objective emphasis) to an examination of the how of the givenness
of the object (with its emphasis on modes of givenness). The question for Gadamer is how
meaning is constructed and what constitutes and limits the process of construction. The
answer  to  the  latter  question  for  Gadamer  is  history.  History  constitutes  our
interpretative capacity by giving us our cultural practices, habits, customs, and concepts
as inheritances. By these we are prejudiced in our interpretive projects. Furthermore,
Gadamer inherits  Husserl’s  concept  of  an horizon,  as  the ever-shifting temporal  and
spatial limit of our perspective, and translates it into a cultural and conceptual limit, but
one which may be fused with others’ horizons in the experience of understanding the
Other. 
41 Therefore,  Gadamer  gives,  in  Truth  and  Method,  both  an  account  of  historical
interpretation and an example of it. This insures that his contribution does not pose as
standing outside of the insights he presents,  and avoids assuming a self-undermining
posture,  an  attack  to  which  the  postmodernists  are  susceptible.  Gadamer  takes
phenomenology  to  be  the  key  to  overcoming  this  problem  of  objectivity  in  history
(Gadamer 2004).  By conceiving of our fundamental and ontological orientation to the
world  as  hermeneutic,  Heidegger  offered  a  full-blown  structure  to  the  way  the
understanding works in its capacity as projective towards an indeterminate horizon. By
giving interpretation a fundamental role, not a supplemental one, in our conception of
understanding,  Gadamer  reinvests  the  understanding  with  subjectivity.  And  such
subjectivity  is  always  already  historically,  and  therefore  culturally  and  conceptually,
situated.  The  historicity  of  the  hermeneutic  experience  speaks  to  the  limitations  of
hermeneutical  consciousness  and  the  finitude  of  human  experience.  As  Tsenay
Serequerbehan put it: “The hermeneutical consciousness does not start from certainties
but from a recognition of  its  own limitations and an experienced appreciation of  its
heritage” (Serequeberhan 1987: 53). In overcoming the problem of objectivity in history,
Gadamer  is  overcoming  the  prejudice  against  prejudice  which  emerged  during  the
Enlightenment (Gadamer 2004). The prejudice against prejudice suggested that some self-
same  foundation,  such  as  reason,  could  achieve  the  quest  for  certainty  in  science,
including historical inquiry.
42 In order to reveal the dialogical  and interactive structure of interpretation,  Gadamer
emphasizes the need for application of interpretation, and this I offer as evidence of his
pragmatic sensibility. Two of his analogues to this process are that we interpret scripture
in  our  application  of  it  in  the  activity  of  preaching,  and  we  interpret  laws  in  our
application of them to specific cases. The process of interpretation is interactive with the
process of applying interpretation. The two mutually inform each other (Gadamer 2004).
This is similar to the pragmatic conception of the relation between theory and practice.
The former should not be developed antecedent to the latter, much as Gadamer warns
against the formulation of any method over and above that which he is instantiating in
his history of hermeneutics. 
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43 By his admission of the inevitability of prejudice, Gadamer discloses that which historical
positivists want to efface. By his admission of tension with a common object, Gadamer
resists the equation of prejudice and object and refuses to inflate interpretability beyond
its necessary and conservative constraints, which means that interpretation cannot be
poured into any historical text as if such a text were an inert receptacle. Furthermore,
practice and application mutually inform conceptualization and theory.  Any practical
application of  theory and interpretation is  constrained by the historical  reception of
concepts which circumscribe, either positively or negatively, the manner in which we
project our understanding onto the common objects of interpretation (Gadamer 2004).
Historical inquiry, qua Gadamerian hermeneutics, confronts the crisis of the sciences by
way of phenomenology, and helps overcome the problem of objectivity; that is, it refuses
to pose as positive science and does not attempt to ground historical science upon any
“foundation.” However, it does not reduce itself to narrative fiction. Guided by pragmatic
and conservative norms, it resists historical relativism. 
 
A Conservative and Pragmatic Judicial Theory
44 Both Dewey and Gadamer share a common resistance to historical relativism and its view
of  history  as  mere  redescritive  novelty.  Such  a  point  of  commonality  evinces  their
conservatism. But both Dewey and Gadamer also share an anti-foundational stance, and
both respond to the crisis of the sciences. These similarities evince their pragmatism.
Additionally,  their  approaches to historical  inquiry share a  concern for  the practical
application of the study of history. Both see historical understanding registering as a
norm  of  application.  Further,  both  see  that  norm  guiding  the  practice  of  judicial
determinations in the court of law, and here we can further see their shared pragmatic
sensibility. If we are to conserve the ability of inquiry in the social sciences to resolve
problems, we might see how both Dewey and Gadamer give space for historical inquiry to
help a judge resolve problems demanding historical understanding. In doing so, Dewey
and Gadamer provide a theory of historical inquiry consonant with a conservative and
pragmatic judicial theory. 
45 As we saw above, Dewey exemplifies the way in which adjudicating a problematic and
indeterminate situation or case is a synthesis of several temporal phases of inquiry. As an
inferential judgment about present propositions which are operationally historical, the
judge existentially re-qualifies the present, which serves as potentially relevant data for
future propositions operating on the to-be-historical present. What this means is that
cries against judicial activism are philosophically analogous to cries against historical
revisionism. Judges or historians proper use the conceptual subject-matter of the present
cultural environment in order to make historical judgments using present propositions
operating historically to resolve novel problematic situations in a trial-at-court (Dewey
1938). 
46 Similar to Dewey, Gadamer refers to the law in order to exemplify the nature of historical
inquiry qua hermeneutics. With respect to legal theory Gadamer writes, “The meaning of
a law that emerges in its normative application is fundamentally no different from the
meaning reached in understanding a text” (Gadamer 2004: 310). Gadamer claims that “a
law does not exist to be understood historically,” but to be made concrete “in its legal
validity by being interpreted” (Gadamer 2004: 307). In judicial determinations, the judge
must  embrace  the  tension  between  the  law  as  a  common  historical  object  and  the
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changing circumstances and cases in which it  must be understood,  and then applied
(Gadamer 2004). Similar to Heidegger, but also similar to Dewey, Gadamer emphasizes the
situatedness of  interpretation – that understanding always occurs within an event of
tradition,  a  “process of  handing down” (Gadamer 2004:  308).  Further the judge must
subordinate herself to the text and interpret its will in light of the temporal distance
separating her from it and trying to overcome the “alienation of meaning” which the
legal text has undergone (Gadamer 2004: 308). This balance between the inheritance of
the  past  and  the  need  for  an  attunement  to  the  context  of  the  involved  situation
demanding judgment speaks to the conservatism and the pragmatism of these thinkers.
And as I  show below, their understanding of historical  inquiry is a condition for the
possibility of a conservative and pragmatic judicial theory. 
47 Before completing a brief picture of what a pragmatic and conservative judicial theory
would look like, I need to distance it from any colloquial associations these terms might
harbor.  These  pragmatic  and  conservative  norms  are  methodological.  They  are  not
political.  Pragmatic  does  not  mean  left-wing  or  favoring  judicial  activism,  and
conservative does not mean right-wing or reactionary. When legal theorists label judges
as conservative, they often mean that their decisions favor a certain coalition of right-
wing political, social, or economic interests.3
48 The conditions for a pragmatic and conservative judicial theory fall along several fault
lines.  Both  reject  a  purely  formal  approach  to  adjudication.  The  pragmatist  sees
formalism as an extension of the axiomatic and analytic conceptions of law built on the
model of positivism,4 one of the two poles avoided by both Dewey and Gadamer. The
conservative rejects formalism as well because she elevates customary law above either
forward-looking  statutory  law  or  judicial  decisions  arrived  at  only  as  deductive
conclusions.  This  priority  of  law in  custom speaks  to  the  inheritance  of  tradition,  a
Gadamerian insight, and is also pragmatic, as it announces the origin of law in practice
not in theory, a Deweyan insight (Dewey 1940).5 Next both pragmatism and conservatism
require  that  sound  adjudication  demands  robust  historical  inquiry.  Norms  guiding
adjudication should not be imported as a priori abstractions from outside the situation
demanding  inquiry;  nor  (qua conservative)  should  they  be  read-into  the  past  in  a
relativist approach to history unconstrained the norms and conceptual schemes of the
historian; nor (qua pragmatist) should they be lifted from past precedent without special
attention to present conditions. The conservative need for historical inquiry constrains
its use, preventing radical reforms which can bring with them conditions worse than the
situation  which  gave  rise  to  their  need.  The  pragmatic  need  for  history  can  work
negatively to show when general principles no longer suit present conditions and are ripe
for reconstruction, and this is part of Dewey’s and Gadamer’s resistance to universalism
and foundationalism. 
49 The pragmatism of both Gadamer and Dewey accepts an anti-foundational approach to
social  scientific  inquiry,  much  as  it  rejects  the  presuppositions  of  positivism.  The
conservatism of Gadamer and Dewey constrains social scientific inquiry with an improved
understanding of the relationship between the problems which give rise to our inquiries
and the tools which help resolve them. I argue that Gadamer and Dewey, in the different
keys of phenomenology and naturalism, play the same theme. In doing so they accept the
negative and critical  valence of Rorty’s postmodernism and neopragmatism. But they
refuse to jump into the postmodern abyss. By providing the excluded middle between
historical  positivism  and  historical  relativism,  they  provide  the  norms  which  make
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possible a conservative and pragmatic judicial theory. Such a theory resists the model of
legal positivism and the model of unconstrained judicial radicalism. The play between
these two poles provides a model of adjudication which allows for growth and reform in
the law, as responses to the changes in other forms of culture, such as art and science,
without reducing the process of adjudication to mere discursive flight. Their conservative
and pragmatic philosophy of historical inquiry and the judicial theory it makes possible
refuses to pose as science, but in doing so, it does not turn into narrative fiction.
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NOTES
1. Postmodernist  and  relativist  history,  in  its  most  excessive  incarnations,  results  only  in
“expressions  of  an  infinitely  self-reflexive  nexus  of  literary  descriptions  and  redescriptions
which are tantamount to interminable discursive flights that do not offer the possibility of firm,
behavioral, referential perches,” as Larry Hickman put it (Hickman 2007: 51). Rorty raises the
relativism of infinite interpretability and redescription to an absolute of its own, the same way
Nietzsche raised anti-reason to one. 
2. That Husserl wrote with naturalism in the background as a tacit or explicit opponent should
not prevent the building of any bridges between phenomenology and pragmatism. Dewey was a
naturalist, but he worked with a method of non-reductive empiricism, which refused to reduce
experience to sensation, as some British empiricists and the positivists did. See John Dewey, “The
Concept of the Reflex Arc in Psychology,” (Dewey 1896). Further, Dewey offered the postulate
that “things – anything and everything – […] are what they are experienced as” (Dewey 1905). His
naturalism was radically  empirical,  inspired in  part  by William James,  of  whom Husserl  was
another  inspired  reader.  His  turn  to  view  things  as  they  are  experienced  can  be  described
according to the phenomenological catch phrase, “to the things themselves.” Dewey, too, was
looking at  the how of  givenness,  although never articulating any explicit  epoché,  as  Peirce,  a
fellow pragmatist, did, in his description of presentness when he wrote: “The first and foremost
is that rare faculty, the faculty of seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself,
unreplaced by any interpretation, unsophisticated by any allowance for this or for that supposed
modifying circumstance.  This  is  the faculty  of  the artist  who sees  for  example the apparent
colors of nature as they appear” (Peirce 1958-66, 5: 1.42). Here, Peirce, the founder of American
pragmatism, “brackets” “interpretation” and “modifying circumstances.” Such was Dewey’s task
in his postulate of immediate empiricism (Dewey 1905). For even more insight into the historical
connections between pragmatism and phenomenology, see Bell J. M. (2011).  Husserl advised a
dissertation  on  Royce  by  Winthrop  Bell,  and  Husserl  was  therefore  well  aware  of  Royce’s
pragmatic idealism. 
3. These colloquial  associations die hard. Ronald Dworkin referred to this tendency when he
claimed that popular imagination sorts Supreme Court justices into two camps, “liberal” and
“conservative.” Dworkin thinks that one criterion for distinguishing these two camps lines up
more or less along the lines of right and left wing politics. See Dworkin R., (1986: 358). Richard
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Posner  recently  made  a  similar  assertion.  Justices  are  considered  conservative  and  liberal
according to their politics. See Posner R. (2008: 9).
4. Legal  pragmatists,  such  as  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  Jr.,  reacted  to  the  formalism  and  the
positivism of  the  utilitarian  approaches  to  law,  offered  by  John Austin,  a  student  of  Jeremy
Bentham. Holmes has been offered by several intellectual historians as a founder of American
pragmatism. His preparatory essays for the The Common Law (1881) were written around the time
he was in conversation with other classical American pragmatists, C. S. Peirce and William James.
5. Dewey maintained this in his essay “My Philosophy of Law” (1940). The principles guiding
adjudication need to emerge from customary practice because that is where they must return,
and importing them from outside communal practice or the relevant situation decreases the
probability that they would ameliorate the legal situation to which they apply.
ABSTRACTS
In this article I present two theories of historical inquiry, which I characterize as conservative
and pragmatic. I argue that these two views of history, John Dewey’s and Hans Georg Gadamer’s,
provide  an  excluded  middle  between  the  extremes  of  positivism  and  relativism.  They  are
pragmatic  insofar  as  they  accept  the  anti-foundationalist  critique  of  positivism;  they  are
conservative insofar as they refuse to reduce historical inquiry to mere discourse or narrative.
Both focus on the situatedness of historical inquiry, paying special attention to the culturally
emergent  conceptual  schemes  and  prejudices  of  the  historian, but  they  constrain  historical
inquiry  by  providing  an  improved  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the  problems
which give rise to our inquiries and the tools which help resolve them. Dewey, in the key of
naturalism, and Gadamer,  in the key of phenomenology,  provide conservative and pragmatic
philosophies of historical inquiry, which refuse to pose as science, but do not fall into narrative
fiction.  Additionally,  their  approaches to  historical  inquiry share a  concern for  the practical
application of the study of history. In this concern for application, both Dewey and Gadamer
provide  a  theory  of  historical  inquiry  consonant  with  a  conservative  and  pragmatic  judicial
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